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One of the motivations for voting is that one vote can make a difference.  In a presidential election,
the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your state is necessary for an
electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied in that event.  We computed
these probabilities a week before the 2008 presidential election, using state-by-state election forecasts
based on the latest polls.  The states where a single vote was most likely to matter are New Mexico,
Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado, where your vote had an approximate 1 in 10 million chance
of determining the national election outcome.  On average, a voter in America had a 1 in 60 million
chance of being decisive in the presidential election.
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Abstract.  One of the motivations for voting is that one vote can make a difference.  In a 
presidential election, the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your 
state is necessary for an electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied 
in that event.  We computed these probabilities a week before the 2008 presidential election, 
using state-by-state election forecasts based on the latest polls.  The states where a single vote 
was most likely to matter are New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado, where your 
vote had an approximate 1 in 10 million chance of determining the national election outcome.  






What is the probability that one vote will make a difference?  This is of interest in the utility 
theory of voting and also for campaign strategists who must assess the costs and benefits of 
attempting to persuade or turn out voters in particular states.
5  In a presidential election, the 
probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your state is necessary for an 
electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied, conditional on your state 
being necessary. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are three ways of estimating the probability of a decisive vote.  The first 
approach, and the oldest in the literature,
6 is to set up a theoretical model for the joint distribution 
of the popular vote margin in the separate jurisdictions (in this case, the 50 states plus the District 
                                                            
1 To appear in Economic Inquiry.  We thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and the National Science 
Foundation for financial support. 
2 Department of Statistics and Department of Political Science, Columbia University, gelman@stat.columbia.edu, 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman 
3 Baseball Prospectus, http://fivethirtyeight.com  
4 Richard Jenning Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 
edlin@econ.berkeley.edu  
 
5 There is a large literature on utility models for voting; see, for example, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) and, for our 
own view, Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007).  See Stromberg (2008) for a recent analysis of the relation between 
electoral strategy and the probability of a decisive vote. 
 
6 Examples include Good and Mayer (1975) and Chamberlain and Rothchild (1981); see Gelman, Katz , and Bafumi 




of Columbia) and then analytically compute the probability of each state being nationally 
decisive and locally tied.  Such models offer important insights but are not directly useful for 
presidential elections, given that our interest is in the particularities of individual states in 2008 
rather than on general properties of an electoral system. 
 
The second approach is purely empirical, an estimate of the form y/n, where n is the number of 
elections in some large historical sample and y is the number that were tied.  Elections are very 
rarely tied, so one can instead use an estimate such as y/(2000n), where y is now the number of 
elections decided by less than 1000 votes.  Such an empirical analysis can be embedded into a 
regression of vote differential on election-level predictors.  Mulligan and Hunter (2003) use such 
a model for estimating the average probability of a decisive vote in legislative elections, and 
Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi (2004) use the distribution of aggregate vote margins to study the 
dependence of the probability of a tie on the number of voters.
7  Unfortunately, the complex 
structure and the small number of presidential elections rule out a purely empirical approach in 
this case. 
 
The third method, which we use here, is to set up a forecasting model for the current election.  
The uncertainties for the 50 statewide elections in such a model should be correlated—or, 
equivalently, the model should have a national error term, and possibly regional error terms, in 
addition to any independent state errors.  Given a forecast that is a joint probability distribution, 
one can calculate the probability of decisive vote using simulation or, in a setting such as a 
national election in which the probability of a tied election is tiny, one can use a mix of 






We use a state-by-state election forecast computed on 24 October 2008 using based on the latest 
opinion polls (Silver, 2008).  Earlier in the campaign, polls are not particularly informative, and 
it is better to use regression-based forecasts, at least to account for possible national swings (see 
Lock and Gelman, 2008 and, for further discussion, Wlezien and Erikson, 2004, and the 
                                                            
7 An objection sometimes arises about this sort of calculation that one vote never makes a difference, because if the 
election were decided by one vote, there would be a recount anyway.  Gelman, Katz, and Bafumi (2004, p. 674) 
discuss why this argument is wrong, even for real elections with disputed votes, recounts, and so forth.  This can be 
shown by setting up a more elaborate model that allows for a gray area in vote counting and then demonstrating that 
the simpler model of decisive votes is a reasonable approximation.  
 
8 Another approach, which we do not consider here, is to derive an implicit probability distribution for vote 
outcomes using the prices on election betting markets.  This method might seem appealing at first but it falls apart in 
practice, at least based on the current state of the betting markets.  For example, www.intrade.com assigned McCain 
a ridiculously high 3% chance of winning the District of Columbia.  Prediction markets do have a role as 
information aggregators, especially for primary elections, where polls are highly unstable and models based on 
fundamentals do not do particularly well.  But for the general election, incorporating information from prediction 





references therein).  By late October, however, polls are close to the actual election outcome and 
so it is reasonable to construct a forecast distribution using poll aggregation.
9 
 
The result of our forecasts is a 10,000 x 51 matrix representing 10,000 computer simulations of 
the election, with each simulation including the vote margin for Obama (for example, a margin 
of -.208 in Alabama corresponds to Obama and McCain receiving 60.4% and 39.6%, 
respectively, of the two-party vote in the state).  We convert this percentage to a numerical vote 
margin by multiplying by the voter turnout in the state (which we estimate by taking the two-
party turnout from 2004 and adding 4% corresponding to population increase and another 4% to 
account for an anticipated increase in turnout this year).
10 
 
As we have discussed above, the simulations for the states are correlated:  the joint probability 
distribution of the 51 election outcomes includes uncertainty about the national swing as well as 
state-by-state fluctuations. 
 
We use the forecasts to estimate the probability of a decisive vote in two steps.  For each state: 
1.  Let E be the number of electoral votes in your state.  We estimate the probability that 
these are necessary for an electoral college win by computing the proportion of the 
10,000 simulations for which the electoral vote margin based on all the other states is less 
than E, plus ½ the proportion of simulations for which the margin based on all other 
states equals E.  (This last part assumes implicitly that we have no idea who would win in 
the event of an electoral vote tie.)
11 
2.  We estimate the probability that your vote is decisive, if your state’s electoral votes are 
necessary, by working with the subset of the 10,000 simulations for which the electoral 
vote margin based on all the other states is less than or equal to E.  We compute the mean 
M and standard deviation S of the vote margin among that subset of simulations and then 
                                                            
9 Based on the economy and other factors, political scientists forecasted that the Democrats will receive 51.8% of 
the two-party vote (Hibbs, 2008) or maybe 52.2% (Erikson and Wlezien, 2008).  Such forecasts have standard errors 
large enough that the aforementioned researchers gave McCain a roughly 30% chance of winning, given the 
information available as of June or August.  Were we doing our analysis using pre-October polls, we would 
construct our probability distribution for the election outcome using a weighted average of recent polls and model-
based forecasts.  (See also Campbell, 2008, for further information on recent forecasting models.)  After the 
election, we compared state-by-state forecasts to actual election outcomes and found a very close match , with a 
difference of less than 1 percentage point in 22 states and a difference of less than 3 percentage points in 39 of the 
50 states (Gelman and Sides, 2009). 
 
10 More sophisticated turnout models are possible, for example using recent polls on likely voting.  But such 
adjustments would make only tiny changes to the probability of tie elections.  All that is really important here is that 
we put in a reasonable guess at the total number of votes in each state.  In retrospect, there were some differences 
from 2004 to 2008; for example, Indiana saw an increase in turnout of nearly five percentage points, while Ohio’s 
rate of voter turnout decreased slightly (McDonald, 2009). 
 
11 We ignored the splitting of Nebraska’s and Maine’s electoral votes, which retrospectively turned out to be a 





compute the probability of an exact tie as the density at 0 of the Student-t distribution 
with 4 degrees of freedom, mean M, and scale S.
12 
The product of two probabilities above gives the probability of a decisive vote in the state. 
 
Figure 1 maps the states based on their probability of a vote being decisive:  your vote was, 
prospectively, most likely to matter in New Mexico, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Colorado, 
where a single vote had an approximate 1 in 10 million chance of determining the national 
election outcome.   
 
Figure 2a plots these estimated probabilities as a function of the number of electoral votes in the 
state.  A single vote was more likely to be decisive in smaller states, but the pattern is far from 
deterministic.  Figure 2a shows how the probability of decisive vote (plotted this time on the 
logarithmic scale) depends on the anticipated closeness of the election.  Your vote is much more 
likely to make a difference if you live in a state that is near the national median in partisanship. 
 
Finally, in Figure 3 we decompose the two factors that determine the individual voter’s chance of 
making a difference:  the probability that your state will be needed for an electoral college win, 
and the probability that your stat is tied in that event.  Larger states are more likely to be crucial 
in the electoral vote but less likely to be tied:  for example, we estimate there is a 18% chance 
that the electoral vote margin will be less than 55 (so that California’s 55 electoral votes will be 
crucial), but only a 1 in 100 million chance that California’s immense popular vote will be tied if 
that happens.  At the other extreme, we estimate a less than 1% chance that the electoral college 
will be so close that New Hampshire’s 5 electoral votes will be necessary—but, if they are, the 
probability is a relatively high 1 in 70,000 of a tie vote in the state. 
 
In summary, we estimate the probability of a single vote being decisive as, at most, about 1 in 10 
million in a few states near the national median.  Averaging these probabilities over all the states 






A probability of 1 in 10 million is tiny but, as discussed by Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007), 
can provide a rational reason for voting; in this perspective, a vote is like a lottery ticket with a 1 
in 10 million chance of winning, but the payoff is the chance to change national policy and 
improve (one hopes) the lives of hundreds of millions, compared to the alternative if the other 
                                                            
12 The t distribution with 4 degrees of freedom is commonly used as a robust alternative to the normal (Lange, Little, 
and Taylor, 1989); we use it here to allow for the possibility of unanticipated shocks.  Using the t instead of the 
normal has little effect on the probability of a decisive vote in close states, but it moderates the results in states 
farther from the national median , for example changing the estimated probability of decisiveness in the District of 





candidate were to win.
13  Different voters have different opinions about which candidate is 
desirable, but many can feel that their preference is not only better for them personally but for 
millions of others.  (On the other hand, for voters in states such as New York, California, and 
Texas where the probability of a decisive vote is closer to 1 in a billion, any reasons for voting 
must go beyond the any instrumental rationality.) 
 
We can also consider the incentives for campaigns and voter organizers.  We estimate that 
turning out 1000 additional voters for your side (or persuading 500 people to change their vote) 
in New Mexico would have a 1.3% chance of flipping the state in the event (with probability 
1.2%) that its electoral votes are decisive, which combine to a 1 in 6000 chance of swinging the 
national election.  The same effect could be attained at the national level by persuading 10,000 
random supporters to vote or by persuading 5,000 random supporters of the other side to switch. 
 
From a mathematical perspective it is unsurprising that the states near the national median are 
those where a vote is most likely to make a difference, and this is consistent with campaigns’ 
focus on a few key swing states such as New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado.  
In 2008, Ohio, Florida, and Pennsylvania were in the second tier of priority. 
                                                            
13 Hansen, Palfrey, and Rosenthal (1987) discuss the cost of voting, and Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2008) estimate 
the dollar-equivalent benefits, considering voting as equivalent to a charitable contribution.  Fowler (2006) gives 
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Figure 1.  States with lighter colors are those where a single vote was more likely to be decisive.  
A single vote (or, for that matter, a swing of 100 or 1000 votes) was most likely to matter in New 
Mexico, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Colorado, where your vote had an approximate 1 in 10 
million chance of determining the national election outcome.  Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of 
Columbia are not shown on the map, but the estimated probability of a single vote being decisive 




         
 
 
         
 
Figure 2.  Probability of a decisive vote plotted vs. the number of electoral votes and, on the 
logarithmic scale, vs. Obama’s predicted vote in each state.  The probability that your vote 








Figure 3.  Probability that your vote in any particular state is decisive, factored into its two 
component parts:  the probability of your state’s electoral votes being necessary, and the 
probability of your state being tied, given that its electoral votes are necessary.  The two 
probabilities multiply to give the chance that a single vote is pivotal.  The blue lines show 
different levels of this probability, which is at most about 1 in 10 million.  However, as discussed 
by Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007), it can be rational to vote even when your chance of being 
decisive is this low. 